

PERSONAL LAWS, TRIPLE TALAQ AND GRUNDNORM

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INTRODUCTION

We are a country which gladly affirm to be the world's largest majority rule government, ensuring the insurance of equivalent rights to every one of our natives while intensely holding the banner over-top of being a secular country. In any case, underneath all the ruddy cases, lies the savage underbelly of unfair and oppressive individual laws which tear separated the establishment of balance whereupon our awesome country was fabricated. The most deplorable type of oppression to which Muslim ladies have been subjected to since time immemorial is the over the top routine with regards to triple talaq. The act of triple talaq is absolutely not without what's coming to its of discussions. In any case, the disturbing viewpoint is that the alleged triple talaq, or moment separate, has been restricted in more than 20 Muslim nations, including our neighbors; Pakistan and Bangladesh, making it a reason for genuine concern.

PERSONAL LAWS

The British organization took upon itself the obligation of both characterizing and settling individual law, which required that it figure out which practices would constitute law, and which would just have social constrain.² The British insistence on 'clarity, certainty and definitiveness' was alien to Hindu and Islamic traditions, whose traditions and custom were 'not of a nature to bear the strict criteria imposed by British lawyers.'³ The foundation of the High Courts in India in 1864 additionally rendered invalid the position of 'law officers', like Shastris and Maulvis, who were in charge of offering printed understandings and conclusions relating to individual law. This procedure likewise supplanted the possibility that socio-religious countries depended on changing

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²The Government of Social Life in Colonial India (04/07/2017), <http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9781139415545>

³ TRIPLE TALAQ, (2016), <http://cscs.res.in/dataarchive/textfiles/textfile.2008-07-22.9145923915/file> (last visited Apr 7ADAD).

convictions and confidence with the specialist rather allowed to target specialists, similar to Courts, to distinguish settled convictions decided at the season of the beginnings of such country. For instance, the Aga Khan case (High Court of Bombay, 1866), regarded the Khoja people group as Muslim and the Pushtimargis as Hindu rather than them being considered as free countries inside these bigger religions. The outcome of this was clear – politics that beforehand decided their own concept of the religious conventions in which they connected with were presently subjected toward the Western origination of Hindu and Islamic law.⁴ Consequently, the possibility that religious/individual law exists as it was composed in the Smriti or the Quran overlooks the mind boggling frameworks of 'authoritative administration' inside religious groups that empowered them to re-decipher message in light of changing societal standards. By taking ceaselessly the capacity of these nearby aggregate structures to settle on choices for themselves, these structures were constrained to surrender all basic leadership, concerning individual law, in addition to other things, to the Imperial government which settled on choices in light of universal or an aggregate method of rationale – endlessly not quite the same as the ones taken after at the neighborhood level. The development to bring the neighborhood group into people in general circle was subsequently not a natural one, and was accomplished for the sole motivation behind making them more agreeable to concurrence with societal and religious standards characterized by the British.

TRIPLE TALAQ

Talaq is a right given to men by Islam to separate his better half in the event that if the marriage cannot be proceeded for some reasons. It is like Khula, a right given to Muslim ladies to separate from her spouse if she feels they cannot live respectively henceforth. There is one noteworthy difference between both the procedures. For ladies' situation Islam give her additional flexibility i.e. A lady can separate her husband(khula) with immediate impact. Yet, if there should arise an occurrence of the talaq, once given, the spouse needs to sit tight for three months. This is the point at which we need to think about the triple talaq . The triple talaq doesn't mean saying or informing "talaq" three times and closure marriage. Or maybe it implies the individual needs to sit tight for a

⁴ PERSONAL LAWS, (2012), <https://www.swb.co.in/store/book/question-community> (last visited Jul 9, 2017).

time of three months . Inside the stipulated time if there is change at the top of the priority list or the concerned issue is settled commonly, they beyond any doubt can proceed with the marriage .

“Divorced women remain in waiting for three periods, and it is not lawful for them to conceal what Allah has created in their wombs if they believe in Allah and the Last Day. And their husbands have more right to take them back in this [period] if they want reconciliation. And due to the wives is similar to what is expected of them, according to what is reasonable. But the men have a degree over them [in responsibility and authority]. And Allah is Exalted in Might and Wise”⁵

For the second time (which will undoubtedly happen promptly) in the event that they confront a difficult issue, Talaq can be articulated again with a similar method.

“Divorce is twice. Then, either keep [her] in an acceptable manner or release [her] with good treatment...”⁶

Meanwhile it is the responsibility of the relatives to attempt to bring them together⁷. The Muslim priest (The Jama'ah) can likewise be approached .The third time will be the last possibility given to a muslim. Things turn out to be totally intense for the spouse.

“And if he has divorced her [for the third time], then she is not lawful to him afterward until [after] she marries a husband other than him. And if the latter husband divorces her [or dies], there is no blame upon the woman and her former husband for returning to each other if they think that they can keep [within] the limits of Allah . These are the limits of Allah , which He makes clear to a people who know”⁸

After the third Talaq the marriage has truly arrived at an end now. The three shots are depleted at this point. And, after its all said and done the spouse wishes to rejoin which is unrealistic unless the wife who have entered another marriage (if this happens) divorces her significant other which is exceedingly incomprehensible.

⁵ [The Quran 2:228]

⁶ [The Quran 2:229]

⁷ [Surah An-nisa 4:34, 35] as cited by Faizur Rahman, “Instant Divorce is alien to Islam’s spirit”, Indian Express, Kochi ed., June 17th, 2008; An Enlightenment Commentary into the Light of the Holy Quran (The Scientific and Religious Center, Iran, 2nd edn., 1995)

⁸ [The Quran 2:230]

This is how ISLAM deals with TRIPLE TALAQ.

In spite of the fact that Shias and Sunnis have diverse perspectives with respect to triple Talaq⁹ certain vital things like the principles of virtue of the women (from menstruation), status of her virginity, holding up periods as indicated in Quran and so forth should be entirely clung to, to approve any separation. The scarcest deviation invalidates the divorce.¹⁰

The Supreme Court in **Shamim Ara v. State of U.P. and Anr**¹¹ has held this perspective of Quran expressing that there must be legitimate explanations behind separating somebody and there must be an endeavor to reconcile. It has been held in other cases in High Court¹² too the most noteworthy case being **Kunimohammed v. Ayishakutty**¹³.

PERSONAL LAWS AND CONSTITUTION

Ambedkar famously argued-“*The religious conceptions in this country are so vast that they cover every aspect of life, from birth to death. There is nothing which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we will come to a standstill. I do not think it is possible to accept a position of that sort. There is nothing extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with ceremonials which are essentially religious. It is not necessary that the sort of laws, for instance, laws relating to tenancy or laws relating to succession, should be governed by religion.*”

Any law in drive at the season of coming into compel of the Constitution of India or established after that which is in strife with the part on essential rights will be void to that

⁹ Asaf A. A. Fyzee, *Outlines of Muhammadan Law* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 5th ed., 2008), p. 180.

¹⁰ Adele K. Ferdows, *The Status and Rights of Women in Ithna Ashari Shi'I Islam*, (Women and the Family in Iran – Leiden EJ Brill – 1985 – pg. 29).

¹¹ (2002) 7 SCC 513; cites with approval: *Sri Jiauddin Ahmed v. Mrs. Anwara Begum* (1981) 1 GLR 358; *Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar* (1981) 1 Gau. L.R. 375;

¹² *Riaz Fatma v. Mohammed Sharif I* (2007) DMC 26; 135 (2006) DLT 205; *Ummer Farooque v. Naseema* 2005 (4) KLT 565; *Nur Ali (Md) v. Thambal Sana Bibi* 2007 (1) GLT 508

¹³ 2010 (2) KHC 63

degree. This is concerning every one of the laws in India except for Personal Laws. On the off chance that the individual laws were likewise secured by Articles 13 and 372 of the Constitution, they would be void to the degree that they are in negation of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution; however this is not the situation. Any individual law which is tested, if discovered biased against ladies ought to have been struck around the Courts. Ladies not being regular watchmen, Talaq, polygamy, nonappearance of coparcenary rights for ladies under Hindu unified family, and so on should all have been announced as void at this point as they all oppress ladies. Be that as it may, this has not happened in light of the fact that individual laws are generally not "laws" mulled over under articles 13 and 372. Legal activism has entered each niche and corner and has been taking perception of every day matters, for example, laying of legitimate quality streets, congestion of school transports yet in any case, hasn't plainly managed the personal laws of India.

Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has taken distinctive perspectives while managing personal laws. In various cases it hosts held that individual laws of gatherings are not powerless to Part III of the Constitution managing key rights. Along these lines they can't be tested as being disregarding key rights, particularly those ensured under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Then again, in various different cases the Supreme Court has tried individual laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights and perused down these laws or translated them in order to make them predictable with fundamental rights. There is be that as it may, no consistency of choices in the matter of whether individual laws can be tested on the touchstone of central rights i.e. regardless of whether they are "laws" or "laws in drive" under Article 13 of the Constitution of India¹⁴.

The instance of *Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India*¹⁵ is a case of how legal has deciphered the current law to guarantee the assurance of the mother's advantage. A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court was thinking about the Constitutional legitimacy of S. 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. The test was on the premise that the segment victimizes ladies, as the father is the normal gatekeeper of a minor and not the mother. The Court did not dismiss the Petition on the ground that it couldn't go into

¹⁴ *State of West Bengal v. Committee for protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal*, AIR 2010 SC 1476 (1490).

¹⁵ 1999 2 SCC 228

Constitutional legitimacy of individual law. Rather it perused down S.6 in order to get it consonance with Articles 14 and 15 and 21. The Court said:

“Is that the correct way of understanding the section and does the word ‘after’ in the section only mean ‘after the lifetime’? If this question is answered in the affirmative, the section has to be struck down as unconstitutional as it undoubtedly violates gender equality, one of the basic principles of our Constitution. The HMG Act came into force in 1956, i.e. six years after the Constitution. Did the Parliament intend to transgress the Constitutional limits and ignore the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution which essentially prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex? In our opinion-No.”

In the case of *N. Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors*¹⁶ the Supreme Court was worried about the issue whether in regard of certain sanctuary in Kerala no one but Brahmins could be appointed as priests. Longstanding utilization and custom was referred to in help of this claim. The Court negated the request and watched:

“Any custom or usage irrespective of even any proof of their existence in pre-constitutional days cannot be countenanced as a source of law to claim any rights when it is found to violate human rights, dignity, social equality and the specific mandate of the Constitution and law made by Parliament. No usage which is found to be pernicious and considered to be in derogation of the law of the land or opposed to public policy or social decency can be accepted or upheld by courts in the country.”

However, in the earlier case of *Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. v. Union of India*¹⁷ where diverse associations had tested through different Petitions various unfair parts of individual laws – both systematized and uncodified crosswise over religions, the Court, depending on the prior choices held that the issues related to administrative activity and the Court couldn't meddle. Once more, for this situation no free reasons were offered in the matter of why personal laws couldn't be defenseless to Part 3 of the Constitution. Regardless, on account of Daniel Latifi¹⁸, the Supreme Court tested the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 on the touchstone of

¹⁶ 2002 8 SCC 106.

¹⁷ 1997 3 SCC 573.

¹⁸ (2001) 7 SCC 740.

fundamental rights. Prominent law specialists and legitimate researchers, for example, D.D.Basu,¹⁹ H.M. Seervai²⁰ and Mohammad Ghause²¹, are likewise of the conclusion that every single individual law including their non-statutory parts are liable to Article 13(1). Further, Muslim Personal Law is in drive in India not as a feature of Muslim religion but rather due to it is perceived by a State enactment, basically the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937. It infers its power as it is perceived under a statutory enactment which would be subjected to the test under article 13(1) of the Constitution.

THOUGHTS ON TRIPLE TALAQ

The Supreme Court is directly considering the legitimate legitimacy of triple talaq under Muslim personal law. As per reports, the Center documented its sworn statement under the steady gaze of the Court, expressing that triple talaq disregards sexual orientation balance and ladies' pride, and furthermore that "no undesirable practice can be hoisted to the status of a fundamental religious practice."²²The expression "fundamental religious practice" seems to have been utilized as a part of reaction to the Muslim Personal Law Board's testimony, which, bury alia, looked for assurance for triple talaq under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In my view, this demonstrates a line of contention which would bring the Supreme Court down the wrong way, and should be stood up to. The utilization of the expression "fundamental religious practice" is a vital piece of the Supreme Court's religious flexibility law under Articles 25 and 26, and goes about as a limit test for concurring established security to religious practices. Reasonably, in any case, triple talaq does not come surprisingly close to rehearses that fall inside the extent of Articles 25 and 26.

There are two explanations behind this. The first is situated in point of reference. In *Narasu Appa Mali*²³, the Bombay High Court held that individual laws (which had not been classified under a statute) were not to be tried on the touchstone of Part III of the

¹⁹ H.M Seervai, *Commentary on the Constitution of India*, Vol. I, p. 155 (1965).

²⁰ D.D.Basu, *Constitutional Law of India*, 254-255 (Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur, 2007).

²¹ Furqan Ahmed, *Triple Talaq: An Analytical Study with Emphasis on Socio-Legal Aspect* (Regency Publication, New Delhi, 1994) at p. 41

²² *Thoughts On triple Talaq*, (2016), <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/govt-opposes-triple-talaq-says-practice-is-against-women-s-dignity/story-DWFACQ2UEDFoBkSBPRzLLK.html> (last visited Jul 5, 2017).

²³ AIR 1952 Bom 84, (1951) 53 BOMLR 779, ILR 1951 Bom 775

Constitution. This recommendation was insisted by the Supreme Court in *Krishna Singh vs Mathura Ahir*²⁴. Article 25 of the Constitution explicitly expresses that “subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.” If individual laws fell inside the extent of Article 25, consequently, they would be liable to different arrangements of [Part III]. In the meantime, according to *Narasu Appa Mali and Krishna Singh*, individual laws are excluded from Part III investigation. In its counter-sworn statement, consequently, the Muslim Personal Law Board trusts the evidence speak for itself upon two legitimate prongs that are conflicting. It can't state that personal laws are excluded from Part III examination, and at the same time contend that they are secured by Articles 25 and 26. The instances of *Narasu Appa Mali and Krishna Singh*, makes it clear that the issue of whether triple talaq is a "basic religious practice" under Islam is unessential to the present enquiry, and the Court should abstain from going into an inquiry that will – once more – make it the mediator of religious precept. This is an intriguing legitimate fiction to press under the watchful eye of the Court – and the Court is no more unusual to embracing such lawful fictions – however it remains a very hazardous one.

There are, obviously, different roads open to the Court. While issuing notice, the Court called triple talaq a "standard" practice. In *Madhu Kishwar vs State of Bihar*²⁵, the Supreme Court held that standard laws would be liable to Part III (while personal laws stayed excluded). In any case, the refinement is shallow, best case scenario, and moreover, if – as in *Narasu Appa Mali* – plural marriage under Hindu conventions was held to fall inside the area of personal law, at that point it is hazy how triple talaq won't fall inside individual law. Another alternative is import the "fundamental religious practices" test from Article 25 into the space of individual law, on the premise that individual law, similar to claims under Article 25, relates to religion. This, in any case, would be a to some degree odd advancement sixty-three years after *Narasu Appa Mali*, particularly in light of the way that the Bombay High Court, all things considered,

²⁴ 1980 AIR 707, 1980 SCR (2) 660

²⁵ 1996 AIR 1864, 1996 SCC (5) 125.

connected the fundamental practices test particularly while arbitrating under Articles 25 and 26, and shunned applying it in holding that personal laws were not subject to Part III.

In my view, there is most likely triple talaq is an illegal practice, and ought to be judicially refuted. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court should abstain from the allurements of rehashing its error in the Make-Up Artists Case, and riding roughshod over existing point of reference so as to accomplish a dynamic result. There is a right and protected method for doing this, which is to allude the case to a three-judge seat, which would then be able to rethink the topic of whether individual laws are liable to Part III of the Constitution, and right its prior mistakes on this score.

CONCLUSION

Ibn Abbas has expressed in Sahih-Muslim that "three separations were dealt with as one amid the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), Caliph Abu Bakr and Caliph Umar's reign."²⁶ Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik and Imam Hanbal considered three separations in a solitary sitting to be bidat (developed or corrupt) and not permissible.²⁷ Thus from Muslim scholars to Muslim majority nations everyone has regarded Triple Talaq to be unIslamic even the facts also suggest the same. The security under Articles 25 and 26 stretch out certification to customs, observances, services, methods of love and so forth which are essential to the religion.²⁸ Such practices to be considered as a piece of the religion, it is important that such practices be viewed by the said religion as a basic and vital part²⁹. Thus in order to save the Muslim women in our country the issue of Personal Laws and Triple Talaq needs to be resolved as quick as possible.

²⁶ [Sahih-Muslim 9: 3492]

²⁷ Alamgir Muhammad Serajuddin, *Shari'a Law and Society: Tradition and Change in the Indian Sub-continent* (Dhaka: Asiatic Society, Bangladesh, 1999) at p. 201.

²⁸ N. Adithyan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106.

²⁹ M P Jain, *Indian Constitutional Law* (LexisNexis, New Delhi, 2014), 7th ed., at p. 1248.